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Kin, Market and State in the Provision 





The provision of financial assistance and personal care in contemporary South 
Africa entails a distinctive combination of state, market and kin. The state 
assists financially the deserving poor, but provides little personal care. Better-
off people rely increasingly on the market for both income support and care. The 
poor rely heavily on kin, especially female, maternal kin. The South African case 
is unlike any of the standard welfare and care regimes identified by Esping-





The provision of financial assistance to and personal care1 for children, the 
elderly, the sick and disabled, and the unemployed in contemporary South 
Africa entails a complex and changing mix of state, market and kin. Like many 
other middle-income countries, the roles played by kin are changing, and the 
roles of the market are expanding. Like some other middle-income countries, the 
role of the state is changing, as welfare states are rebuilt to provide more for the 
poor than for the better off. The specific mix of state, market and kin reflects 
South Africa’s specific colonial history. This article reviews the ways in which 
the state, the market and kin provide financial assistance and personal care to 
those people who need these, and locates the specific South African pattern in 
the broader landscape of welfare and care regimes across the world.  
  
Welfare and care regimes vary in terms of how financial assistance and personal 
care are provided by the state, the market and kin, as well as in some cases non-
government organisations. Esping-Andersen’s seminal work (1990) on the 
‘welfare capitalist’ democracies of the global North distinguished between their 
welfare regimes primarily in terms of the varying extent to which they 
‘decommodified’ their citizens through protecting them against the risk of 
                                           
1
 In this article, ‘financial assistance’ refers to financial transfers through, primarily, social 
assistance programmes; ‘care’ refers to personal care for children, the elderly and the sick or 
disabled, through the provision of accommodation or assistance with daily needs such as 
cooking, shopping, and perhaps even basic mobility. 
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poverty through either social insurance or social assistance. In later work, 
Esping-Andersen (1999) expanded the analysis to consider the extent to which 
states replaced families in providing for children and the elderly. His measures 
of ‘de-familialisation’ included the proportions of both young children in public 
day care and the elderly receiving home-help. His analysis thus considered both 
the financial and the personal dimensions of ‘care’. Although he himself did not 
make this distinction, it is helpful to use the term ‘welfare regime’ to focus 
primarily on mechanisms of income support, and ‘care regime’ to focus 
primarily on the provision of personal care. 
 
For Esping-Andersen, the Nordic social democracies in the second half of the 
twentieth century represented the gold standard, with the state providing 
generous and universal income support, child and elderly care. In contrast to the 
social democracies, the conservative or corporatist welfare regimes of 
continental Europe decommodified unequally – reproducing class inequalities – 
and buttressed rather than subverted a largely familial care regime. The Anglo-
American ‘liberal’ countries decommodified on a minimal and targeted basis. 
‘Defamilialisation’ was considerable, but entailed the transfer of care from the 
family to the market more than to the state. 
 
The further one moved away from Esping-Andersen’s social democratic ideal, 
the less compelling his typology became. The countries of Mediterranean 
Europe challenged his typology due to the much more extensive role of the 
family in the provision of personal care (Ferrera, 1996, 2005; Naldini, 2003; 
Bettio and Plantenga, 2004; Lyon and Glucksmann, 2008; Gal, 2010). In this 
respect, countries such as Spain raised many of the typological challenges raised 
by middle-income countries across the global South, i.e. countries where state 
and market provision was expanding but where family or kin remained central to 
the configuration of care. Gough et al. (2004) characterise many or even most 
welfare regimes in the global South as ‘informal security’ regimes because 
income security is provided primarily through informal channels outside of both 
state and market. Unfortunately, little attention has been paid to variation in the 
precise configurations of care in those middle-income countries where the state 
and market as well as family or kin play important roles. 
 
South Africa is a distinctive case, in that its welfare and care regimes reflect its 
particular colonial and post-colonial history. Extensive defamilialisation among 
the minority white population coexisted with persistent dependence on family 
and kin among the majority African population. Indeed, under apartheid, public 
policy was premised on this dualism. Democratisation deracialised public 
policies, resulting in a pro-poor welfare state, especially in terms of social 
assistance and increasingly, child care. In some respects, however, the state has 
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South Africa’s welfare and care regimes bear the impress of the country’s 
colonial past in terms of both imperial British ‘liberal’ influences on the design 
of state institutions and policies and the resilience of distinctively African 
practices and beliefs about extended kinship. Neither public institutions nor 
social institutions (such as the family) nor cultural beliefs have persisted 
unchanged, but South Africa’s welfare and care regimes reflect their diverse 
origins. 
 
The development of welfare and care regimes in countries across the world has 
been shaped by the transnational diffusion of ideas as well as by domestic 
political, social and economic conditions. In the early twentieth century even the 
European pioneers of welfare state-building were often well-informed about the 
few precedent cases. In mid-century, the International Labour Organisation 
promoted energetically specific models of welfare, a role later taken over by the 
World Bank. In colonies, ideas and models from the imperial power were often 
especially important. Territories within the British imperial world were 
distinctively influenced by the British policies, institutions and left-liberal ideas 
(and by their Australasian variants). In contexts such as South Africa, the policy 
and institutional mix reflected a combination of external ideas and models with 
local or domestic conditions. 
 
In the South African case, the outcome was a welfare and care regime that was 
thoroughly dichotomised through most of the twentieth century. From the 1920s 
the South African state began to construct a welfare state for its white (and to a 
lesser extent coloured) citizens, broadly along British (and Australian) lines, 
providing publicly-funded social assistance and care for ‘deserving’ categories 
of women, children and men who were left poor by the market and their kin. At 
the same time, the state’s African subjects2 were excluded from the welfare state 
and social citizenship as well as from the franchise and political citizenship. 
                                           
2
 Racial categories were and are widely used in South Africa. The post-apartheid state distinguishes 
between white, African, coloured and Indian citizens, replicating the typology used by the apartheid 
state (although with sometimes different labels). ‘Coloured’ is a heterogeneous category, comprising 
non-Bantu indigenous peoples (often referred to as Khoi and San peoples), the descendants of slaves 
brought from south-east Asia (including ‘Malays’), and people with mixed white and African ancestry. 
Most coloured South Africans live in or around Cape Town. ‘Indian’ refers to people of South Asian 
descent. Most Indian South Africans live in or around Durban. 
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Less advantaged white South Africans were given enormous assistance – in 
terms of public schooling, public health and psychiatric care, social welfare and 
social work programmes, as well as labour market and other economic policies – 
to rise up the economic and social hierarchy. However, few resources were 
allocated to the needs of the much more disadvantaged African majority of the 
population, and many apartheid policies in the 1950s and 1960s were designed 
to push better-off non-white people down the economic and social hierarchy 
(Seekings and Nattrass, 2005; Seekings, 2007).  
 
Repressed by the state, and with little power in economic markets, non-white 
South Africans relied heavily on kin for personal care and financial support. 
Apartheid, by dividing African families through the imposition of strict controls 
over who could live where, served to ensure that many working adults left their 
children to be raised by the children’s grandparents, who they supported through 
the remittance of a share of their earnings. The state thus undermined parental 
care for children and relied on the extended family among the African 
population.  
 
The apartheid project was so successful that, from the 1970s, white South 
Africans enjoyed massive market advantages and needed less and less the 
services provided by the welfare state. Risk-pooling and income-smoothing 
through contributory ‘semi-social’ insurance schemes expanded, with some 
regulation from the state, but for the most part run by the private sector. The 
imperatives of economic growth and political stability pushed the apartheid state 
towards a slow and partial reallocation of scarce public resources away from 
white citizens and towards coloured and Indian people, and later African people, 
especially in urban areas. 
 
 
The post-apartheid welfare and care regimes 
 
The first democratically-elected government inherited in 1994 a state that 
retained an extensive set of welfare state services, most of which were in the 
process of being deracialised and thus reoriented towards the poor. The new 
democratic state quickly moved to complete this deracialisation with respect to 
most social programmes, including the public provision of financial assistance. 
One exception was state care for the elderly, hitherto largely reserved for white 
people. On this, the state rolled back public provision. The expansion of public 
welfare for the poor coincided with a decline in kinship-based care and financial 
assistance. At the same time, ‘middle class’ white, Indian, coloured and African 
people continued to abandon public services as they turned to the market for 
health care and to the semi-marketised top end of the ‘public’ school system for 
 
5 
the education of their children. The middle class and even working class 
resorted increasingly to the market for the personal care of both children and the 
elderly. 
 
The provision of care in post-apartheid South Africa thus comprises extensive 
but uneven public provision, a probably growing role for market provision, and 
continuing if diminished kin provision – all combined in different ways for 
different social and economic groups. Overall, an astonishing volume of care 
and assistance is needed and given in contemporary South Africa. 
Approximately three-quarters of the total population of about 50 million people 
in South Africa require care or financial support of some sort (see Table 1). This 
figure includes approximately 20 million children (defined here as up to the age 
of eighteen) and 3 million non-working elderly people (defined here as over the 
age of sixty years), as well as 1 million men and women of working age (defined 
here as between the ages of eighteen and sixty years) who are sick (many 
because of AIDS or tuberculosis) or disabled, and a further 12 million men and 
women of working age who are not working themselves and remain financially 
(and often emotionally) dependent on others. Some of these non-working, able-
bodied men and women of working age choose not to work. Most, however, are 
not working because there is no work. Mass, chronic and involuntary 
unemployment is arguably the most important scourge of post-apartheid South 
Africa (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005). Some – overwhelmingly women – are 
involved in unpaid domestic or care work that does not qualify as ‘work’ in the 
official statistics, i.e. they are both financial dependents and care-givers. 
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The largest category of people in need of care in South Africa are children. 
South Africa has a fast-growing population with a low median age.3  The most 
glaring category of children needing care are those who do not live with either 
biological parent. In 2009, about 5.5 million children  – including almost one in 
six young children (aged six or less), and almost one in three older children 
(aged seven to seventeen) did not live with either biological parent (see Table 2) 
- most lived with a grandmother. A minority of these are double orphans, but 
most have at least one parent living elsewhere. A tiny proportion (only 1 
percent) lived with non-relatives (Hall and Proudlock, 2011: 5).  
 
                                           
3
 The absolute number of children has, however, fallen. The combination of declining fertility 
and AIDS-related mortality meant that the cohorts born in the 1990s and 2000s are smaller 
than the cohort born in the 1980s. This demographic distribution contrasts with most of 
Africa, where each new cohort is larger than its predecessor. 
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Table 2: With whom do children live? 
 
 







Both 34 31 
Mother only 45 34 
Father only 3 4 
Sub-total 82 69 
Not live with 
either parent 
At least one parent alive 17 23 
Neither parent alive 2 8 
Sub-total 18 31 
Total 100 100 
Source: General Household Survey 2009, own calculations. 
 
Only one in three children live with their biological fathers primarily because of 
the decline of marriage (and infrequency of long-term cohabitation) (Amoateng, 
2004; Posel and Rogin, 2009; Hosegood et al, 2009) but also because of the 
decoupling of sex and motherhood from marriage. Between 1997 and 2006 there 
was a steady increase in the number of households headed by women, to almost 
40 percent (Posel and Rogin, 2009: 31). Women are, in general, increasingly 
independent from the father(s) of their children, in terms of finances and 
accommodation (see Seekings, 2011), and probably emotions as well. This does 
not mean that women are independent, however. Single mothers rely heavily on 
agnatic kin, as we shall see further below. Nor does residential separation 
always mean that fathers fail to play a role in their children’s lives. In Cape 
Town, one in three young people living apart from their fathers reported that 
they spent time with them (Bray et al., 2010: 81; Morrell, 2006; Montgomery et 
al., 2006; Townsend et al., 2006; Madhavan et al., 2008; Madhavan and Roy, 
2011). 
 
Table 2 indicates something of the diversity of living arrangements and family 
forms in South Africa. Few people in South Africa live in nuclear families with 
breadwinner husbands and stay-at-home wives who provide care for their 
children (Spiegel et al., 1996; Russell, 2003). Families are often ‘extended’, 
either vertically (including three generations) or horizontally (including uncles, 
aunts and cousins). This facilitates child care by kin, for example when mothers 
are working. A rather old study of childcare arrangements among working 
African mothers found that almost 40 percent of the women left their children 
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with adult relatives, particularly grandmothers, and 10 percent left their children 
with older siblings (Cock et al., 1984). A more recent survey, in 2008, found 
that parents were almost always deemed to have primary ‘responsibility’ for 
their children, but non-parental kin played a secondary role in caring for as 
many as one in two children living with one or both parents, and one-third of all 
children.4  
 
Kin do not suffice, however, despite high unemployment rates. The 1984 study 
cited above found that 50 percent of working African mothers turned to non-kin 
for childcare: 9 percent left their children with neighbours, 14 percent with 
child-minders, and 14 percent in crèches, whilst 6 percent hired other women to 
care for their young children. Even when women left their children with kin 
(such as the children’s grandmother), the mother usually had to pay. Overall, 
almost three quarters of the sample was paying for childcare, while just under a 
quarter were receiving free childcare (Cock et al., 1984). Historically, children 
in middle class and elite households were cared for by paid non-kin child-
minders, i.e. entirely through the market (see Cock et al., 1984). When defining 
a ‘living wage’ for white South African men in the 1930s, state officials 
assumed that even a working-class white family supported by a single (male) 
breadwinner had to employ a domestic worker. Generations of white children 
born under apartheid were raised by African or coloured women. In the late 
twentieth century, paid childcare seems to have become a much more common 
practice among even those working women who are far from rich. A 2009 
survey found that about 30 percent of all children aged 0 to 4 attended some 
kind of crèche or day care facility.5  Commercial crèches have proliferated, but 
they are often expensive, of unsatisfactory quality, and offer no care at the times 
of the day (or night) when working people are working or travelling to work 
(Moore, 2013).  
 
Domestic employment constituted a market in care, but it was a market that was 
profoundly structured by the state until the end of the twentieth century. The 
state restricted the kinds of work that African or coloured women could do and 
regulated when, where and with whom they could live. Since the end of 
apartheid, formal domestic employment has been subject to a wider battery of 
regulation, covering (inter alia) minimum wages and conditions of employment 
                                           
4
 NIDS wave 1 2008, own calculations. The survey did not make a clear distinction between 
responsibility and care, so it is difficult to compare these data with the 1984 data. The first 
question asked was: ‘Who is the main person responsible for making sure that this child is 
fed, bathed, goes to school if of school going age, helped with homework, taken care of when 
the child is ill, etc?’. The second question asked was: ‘Who else helps to care for the child?’ 
5
 GHS 2009, own calculations. 
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(Fish, 2006; King, 2007; Ally, 2010). Much paid childcare is informal and 
unregulated, however. 
 
In the early 2000s the state began to provide more childcare, on educational 
grounds. It introduced one preschool year at primary school, for five year-olds 
(‘grade R’, for Reception), and it provides means-tested subsidies for registered 
early childhood development centres. But, for children younger than five, and 
many five and even six year-olds also, childcare is provided through the market 
or by kin.  
 
Kin support may be a substitute for market provision, but it is underpinned by 
public provision. The state provides for children not only through subsidised 
schooling (including grade R) and (to a limited extent) crèches, but also through 
financial grants to caregivers as well as subsidised public health care, limited 
social work interventions and a small number of residential institutions. The 
scale of this pro-child welfare state provision is very unusual, and perhaps even 
unique, in the global South, in terms of both the proportions of children reached 
and the expense in relation to GDP.6   
 
A small proportion but nonetheless substantial number of children are in court-
ordered foster care, and many foster care-givers receive the Foster Care Grant 
(worth, in 2012-13, R770 or US$90 per month in December 2012) from the 
state. The numbers of foster child grants paid rose dramatically in the early 
2000s: from about 50,000 in 2002 to about 500,000 by 2010 (Hall and 
Proudlock, 2011: 2; South Africa, 2012: 85).  
 
Originally intended for neglected and abused children, the Foster Care Grant 
became a vehicle for assisting poor kin who had fostered children, either 
because the children had been orphaned – often, recently, because of AIDS – or 
had been abandoned. The 2005 Children’s Act defines a child as ‘in need of care 
and protection’ – and hence eligible for a Foster Care Grant – if he or she ‘has 
been abandoned or orphaned and is without visible means of support’. It has 
been up to the courts to decide what is meant by ‘visible means of support’ 
(section 150(1)(a); see Hall and Proudlock, 2011: 2). In 2011, a Children’s 
Court in Gauteng heard the case of a child (identified only as ‘SS’) whose 
mother left him with her uncle and aunt (a Mr and Mrs Lamani). His uncle and 
aunt received a Child Support Grant. When his mother died, the Lamanis 
applied for a Foster Care Grant, which pays three times as much as the Child 
                                           
6
 This is true even if we consider only social assistance programmes. The Bolsa Familia 
programme in Brazil attracts considerable attention, but its reach (in terms of the proportion 
of households that benefit) and its cost (in proportion to GDP) are each only about 60 percent 
of the equivalent figures for the Child Support Grant in South Africa. 
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Support Grant. The magistrate ruled against them, finding that the purpose of the 
Foster Care Grant was not income support (Hall and Proudlock, 2011: 6). The 
judgement was overturned on appeal in the Johannesburg High Court, in August 
2012. The High Court found that some kin have a ‘duty of support’: biological 
and adoptive parents, maternal and paternal grandparents, and siblings. Step-
parents have a qualified duty of support. Uncles and aunts and other kin – 
including the Lamanis – have no duty of support, and are therefore eligible for a 
Foster Care Grant.7   
 
The judgement upheld the Lamanis’ application, but threatened the grants paid 
to many grandparents. Grandparents are by far the single largest category of 
Foster Care Grant beneficiaries.8  
 
Whilst Foster Care Grants are intended for children who have been fostered 
formally under a court order, on the recommendation of a social worker, Child 
Support Grants are paid to any caregiver of a child subject to their having no or 
modest income. The grant is paid for a large proportion of children living with 
one or both parents and children living with neither parent. About 20 percent of 
Child Support Grants paid with respect to children under the age of seven are 
paid to non-parents, as are 30 percent of grants paid with respect to children 
between the age of seven and seventeen.  In addition, many children are raised 
by grandmothers who receive the much more generous old-age pension. 
Although pensions are supposed to support the elderly, and child grants are 
intended to be for children, in practice pensioners are often caregivers, and 
children are as likely to benefit from pensions as from child grants.9  
 
The generous financial assistance to caregivers through social grants reflects the 
distinctly European origins of South Africa’s welfare state together with the 
specific social and economic conditions in South Africa in the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries. The Child Support Grant has its origins in grants 
paid under the 1913 Child Protection Act, for the protection of, primarily, poor 
white children. From 1926, the Minister of Education was empowered to pay 
modest grants to the mothers, stepmothers and grandmothers of children. 
Concern heightened over poverty among white South Africans during the Great 
                                           
7 SS v Presiding Officer of the Children’s Court: District of Krugersdorp and Others (14/1/4-
206/10, A3056/11) [2012] ZAGPJHC 149; 2012 (6) SA 45 (GSJ) (29 August 2012). 
 http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPJHC/2012/149.html. 
8 The precise proportion is uncertain, because in many cases the grants were incorrectly 
attributed to the payee rather than the child, and it is not immediately obvious which child is 
the supposed beneficiary. 
9 GHS 2009, own calculations. A study in KwaZulu-Natal in 2002 found that 87 percent of 
recipients were mothers, and only 10 percent were grandmothers (Case et al., 2005: 472). 
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Depression. In 1933, a white woman Member of Parliament warned that poor 
white families  
 
‘constitute a danger to the moral life of this country, a danger to 
themselves, a danger to our social order, our national character, and, in 
the end, a danger to our white civilization itself.  This is a country that 
has to take these things into account more than other countries, 
possibly because of its problems of colour.’   
 
Poor people, she emphasised, must be ‘lifted’ up ‘so that they may not constitute 
a danger to our white civilization’.10  A new Children’s Act in 1937 provided for 
a more generous and extensive programme of maintenance grants for poor 
children, supplemented with parental or family allowances from 1942. Grants 
were paid in growing numbers to coloured and Indian families, and even to a 
small number of African families. The transition to democracy in 1994 made it 
politically impossible to retain a programme that almost entirely excluded poor 
African families, but it was fiscally impossible to extend the existing programme 
to poor African families. The Lund Committee of Child and Family Support 
recommended, in 1996, that the existing generous but exclusive system be 
replaced by an inclusive system of Child Support Grants that paid much more 
modest sums to a much larger number of beneficiaries (Lund, 2008). The new 
Child Support Grants were introduced from 1998, for children until their seventh 
birthday. The age limit was steadily raised, eventually to the child’s eighteenth 
birthday. The result was an explosion in the number of grants paid. By 2012, 
eleven million children received Child Support Grants, worth (in 2012-13) a 
modest R280 (about US$30) per month (South Africa, 2012: 85). The 
programme redistributed more than 1 percent of GDP to poor families. 
 
The vestiges of a European-style welfare state for children are evident also in the 
persistence of a small number of publicly-subsidised residential institutions for 
children. At least 13,000 young people live in more than three hundred ‘child 
and youth care centres’ registered under the Children’s Act, whilst an unknown 






The elderly, rather than children, were the focus of the most important pillar of 
the welfare state constructed for mostly white citizens in the 1920s and 1930s. 
                                           
10
 Hansard, House of Assembly, 5th June 1933, col. 294-5. 
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Non-contributory, means-tested old-age pensions were introduced for elderly 
white (and coloured) men and women in 1929. The motivation, as with support 
for poor families, was in part to uphold ‘white civilisation’ and a clear racial 
hierarchy (Seekings, 2007). Pensions were extended to elderly African and 
Indian men and women in 1944, but white pensioners were paid much more 
generous pensions than other pensioners. In the 1970s the apartheid state began 
to reduce racial discrimination in benefits, and finally established parity in 1993, 
on the eve of the country’s first democratic elections (in 1994). Parity was 
established at a generous level. The real value of the old-age pension has hardly 
been changed since 1994. As of mid-2012, the maximum pension payable was 
R1200 (i.e. about US$140) per month. 
 
The old-age pension is means-tested, but the income and wealth thresholds area 
set at a high enough level that only the rich are excluded. The 2009 General 
Household Survey indicates that almost 80 percent of men and women aged 65 
or more received the old-age pension. Women have always been eligible from 
the age of 60. The age of eligibility for men was reduced from 65 to 60 between 
2008 and 2010. Almost three million pensions are paid monthly, redistributing 
more than 1 percent of GDP. 
 
The rationale for old-age pensions from the 1920s was that working-age adults 
were often unable to save enough for their old-age. Some poor elderly men and 
women had no children to turn to for support, whilst many others had children 
who were unable to support their parents (South Africa, 1927: 9-10). The 
extension of pensions to African and Indian men and women in the 1940s was 
motivated in large part by the recognition that neither market nor kin was 
providing adequately for the elderly (Seekings, 2005). In the 1990s, elderly 
women pensioners themselves described the government pension as ‘doing the 
work of our husbands’ or of doing what sons are supposed to do (Møller and 
Sotshongaye, 1996). Because pensions are set at a generous level – higher than 
the minimum wage in some sectors, such that some working people’s incomes 
rise when they retire – pensioners often support their kin rather than vice versa. 
‘My family eat this money too’, said one pensioner (quoted in Møller and 
Sotshongaye, 1996; see also Sagner and Mtati, 1999; Bertrand et al., 2003; 
Klasen and Woolard, 2009; Bohman et al., 2009). 
 
The combination of old-age pensions and high rates of unemployment is one 
reason why few elderly people live alone (or with only another elderly person). 
Three-quarters of elderly people live in households with working-age adults and 
a small number live in households without any working-age adults but with 
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children below the age of eighteen years. Only about one in six elderly people 
lives alone or only with another elderly person.11  
 
The fact that the elderly support financially younger kin does not mean that they 
are not cared for in other senses by their kin. As anywhere, some elderly people 
need care. One in six people aged sixty years or older report that they experience 
at least some difficulty walking, and 6 percent report that they experience at 
least some difficulty caring for themselves.12 Bohman et al. (2009) argue that 
cross-generational care is reciprocal in extended African families, with the 
elderly caring for and being cared by their children and grandchildren. But other 
studies suggest that support for elderly African men and women is less 
forthcoming than support by elderly African people (Burman, 1996). Sagner and 
Mtati (1999) found that most elderly people felt that their adult children were 
not providing them with the kind of support that they deserved. Indeed, one 
reason why elderly pensioners shared their pensions with younger kin was that 
they hoped that their young kin would reciprocate and help them if or when they 
needed assistance. Without the investment of pension-sharing, Sagner and Mtati 
were told, kin might turn their back on the elderly. Kinship no longer ensures 
unconditional care: the provision of financial support and other forms of care is 
now highly conditional (see also Seekings, 2008; Harper and Seekings, 2010). 
 
Despite the fact that an overwhelming majority of elderly people co-reside with 
working-age adults, very few adult women and almost no adult men report 
caring for elderly, sick or disabled members of their households.13 There do not 
appear to be any good data on the extent to which working-age adults care for 
elderly kin living in other households. Given the prevalence of elderly people 
co-residing with working-age kin, it is very unlikely that there is a huge amount 
of care being given to elderly kin living in different households. Overall, 
household survey data suggest that kin do not spend much time caring for the 
elderly. 
 
A small proportion of the elderly are cared for through the market, through 
privately-owned residential institutions. It is unclear what proportion of the 
elderly live in such institutions, not least because household surveys typically 
exclude institutions from their sampling frame. 
 
                                           
11
 NIDS wave 1, own calculations. 
12
 GHS 2009, own calculations. NIDS wave 1 asked about more detailed categories of 
activity. One in three elderly people experience some difficulty doing physical tasks, but very 
few experienced major difficulty doing activities such as bathing or dressing. 




One aspect of the apartheid-era welfare and care regime did not survive the 
transition to democracy. Under apartheid, the state provided – both directly, and 
indirectly via subsidies to churches and NGOs – residential care for elderly 
white men and women. By 1990, as many as 60,000 elderly white, 3,000 elderly 
coloured, an unknown but small number of elderly Indian people, and (since 
1988, when the first old-age home for African people was built in Soweto) a tiny 
number of elderly African people were accommodated in state-run or -
subsidised old-age homes. The state had already begun to shift responsibility for 
elderly white people back onto the ‘community’, and justified its neglect of non-
white people on the grounds that the ‘races’ had different understandings of 
responsibility for the elderly  (SAIRR, 1988: 439-40; SAIRR, 1990: 312). After 
1994, the new democratic state chose not to expand costly public provision for 
elderly African people. In terms of the 2000 Policy on Ageing and 2006 Older 
Persons Act, residential care was to be provided only for the (very) ‘frail and 
dependent’ elderly, who need 24-hour care. Community- and home-based care 
should provide for the ‘semi-fit’ (Malherbe, 2007). This rollback of publicly 




The sick and disabled 
 
Sick and disabled working-age adults constitute the third category of people 
widely considered to be deserving of assistance, whether from private or public 
sources. In South Africa, as in many societies, they are considered deserving 
because their inability to support themselves through work is due to reasons 
beyond their control. In the early and mid-twentieth century, South Africa began 
to develop some of the kinds of public assistance for the sick and disabled that 
were and are widespread across much of north-west Europe. Social assistance 
was extended to blind and otherwise disabled white and coloured people in the 
1930s, and later extended to African and Indian people. Most non-manual 
workers were insured against short periods of lost earnings through illness under 
the state-run Unemployment Insurance Fund. Workers injured whilst working, 
including on the mines, received some compensation under separate legislation; 
the dependents of workers killed in the workplace also received some 
compensation. Whilst the state provided financial assistance, it provided little in 
the way of direct care, except for mentally disabled citizens. 
 
AIDS increased the number of sick working-age people requiring care at the 
same time as widespread unemployment inflated the number of adults unable to 
support themselves. By the 1990s most manual as well as non-manual workers 
were contributors to the Unemployment Insurance Fund, but most unemployed 
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people had never contributed or had not contributed enough to render them 
eligible for health-related income support. In any case, financial assistance was 
provided for only a short time period. The means-tested, non-contributory 
disability grant therefore served as the major vehicle for public financial 
assistance to the sick. In the early 1990s about half a million people received 
disability grants. The number of beneficiaries grew slowly then, between 2001 
and 2004, it doubled, reaching about 5 percent of the total population of 
working-age adults (South Africa, 2012). When the public health care began to 
roll out treatment for AIDS, which resulted in many very sick people becoming 
apparently healthy, the administration of the disability grants became highly 
controversial (Nattrass, 2007). In at least one very poor neighbourhood, 
residents complained to the authorities that some grant beneficiaries were not so 
sick (Kelly, 2012). After 2007, the state tightened access to disability grants, 
arguing that people needed to take more responsibility themselves.  
 
Despite the growth in the number of disability grant payments, many poor and 
even not-so-poor South Africans faced huge challenges due to illness. Besides 
lost earnings, many adults need day care. Richer South Africans can buy care on 
the market, but poorer people have little choice but to turn to kin. Qualitative 
research suggests that, in addition to unemployment which produced high 
dependency rates, AIDS strained the bonds of kinship. Case-studies in both rural 
and urban areas found that sick kin were often unable to call on distant kin, and 
the support of siblings even became quite conditional. Mothers were almost the 
only kin who could be relied on for help, and many people were reluctant to tell 
their mothers that they were HIV-positive (Neves, 2008a, 2008b; Neves and Du 
Toit, 2008; Bray, 2009 ). Elderly women are often the source of care for their 
adult children as well as grandchildren (especially when orphaned). Kinship-
based care is profoundly gendered, and AIDS exacerbated this (Urdang, 2006). 
 
 
Adult dependents without income of their own 
 
With high unemployment rates, many able-bodied working-age adults are 
financially dependent, even if they need no day-to-day care. There is almost no 
financial support for this category of people, who have generally been regarded 
as undeserving of public support. The Unemployment Insurance Fund and 
provident funds support some former workers, for short periods. Unemployed, 
able-bodied, working-age adults constitute the gaping hole in South Africa’s 
social safety net. 
 
Under apartheid, many non-working adults were supported through remittances, 
often sent by migrant husbands, fathers and brothers working in towns or mines. 
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The scale of such remittances declined before the end of apartheid, and has 
continued to decline since the transition to democracy. Between 1993 and 2008 
the real value of remittances across the economy increased, but the value of 
remittances going to the poor declined dramatically. Rather than offsetting 
inequality in income distribution, the changed pattern of remittances actually 
contributed to worsening inequality (Leibbrandt et al., 2012).  
 
Without state support, with little or no access to support through the market, and 
in the context of diminished inter-household remittances, unemployed adults 
have no choice but to try to attach themselves to kin as their dependents. Where 
possible, they remain attached to breadwinners. Unemployment therefore traps 
some people in rural areas and generally delays household formation (Klasen 
and Woolard, 2009). 
 
Dependence on kin does not come without conflict and stress. Care is negotiated 
according to what people think is the ‘right thing’ to do in terms of the context 
and the relationship to the person making claims on them. Grandmothers are 
more willing to support their grandchildren than their adult children, on the 
grounds that the latter should be able to support themselves, although 
allowances are made for the poor job situation. In the ‘normative hierarchy’, 
support for grandchildren comes before support for adult children. For all kin, 
however, how deserving any individual is depends on their behaviour as well as 
their relationship to the carer (Sagner and Mtati, 1999). Quantitative data also 
suggested that the ‘radius of responsibility’ among African people has shrunk. 
People might be able to claim on some extended kin, but on fewer kin than in 
the past, and more conditionally (Harper and Seekings, 2010). Unemployed 
young men are much more likely than unemployed young women to behave in 
ways that weaken the claims that they can make on kin. Young men are less 
likely to contribute to domestic chores (Wittenberg, 2009). This is probably a 
factor in the apparent difficulty that many young men experience in finding a 
stable, long-term source of support. 
 
 
Conceptualising South Africa’s welfare state 
and care regime 
 
Whilst South Africa has massive unemployment and widespread poverty, it is 
also a middle-income country with a state that is, in many respects, strong and 
active. South Africa’s social grant system is not only exceptional in continental 
Africa, but entails very high expenditure in proportion to GDP relative to other 
countries across the global South. Through its social assistance programmes, the 
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South African state reaches about one half of all households, and most poor 
ones.  The state also regulates some aspects of care – including, especially, the 
foster care of children. 
 
The design of the welfare state and state organization of care has many of the 
features associated with the ‘liberal’ welfare regimes of the English-speaking 
advanced capitalist democracies – which is unsurprising, given that many of 
South Africa’s social programmes were designed on the basis of programmes in 
Britain, Australia and New Zealand. There is very limited state involvement in 
risk-pooling, contributory social insurance programmes, and the state’s 
resources are directed towards means-tested social assistance programmes 
focused on standard categories of deserving poor. In terms of their design, the 
state’s social assistance programmes focus on groups of people who cannot 
provide for themselves through the market. In this sense, the state’s programmes 
are residual, filling the gap left by the market. The state has encouraged the 
expansion of market provision, in part to avoid additional fiscal pressures. State 
policy thus promotes contributory pension plans, contributory health insurance, 
and private crèches. With respect to childcare, the expansion of the market has 
been dramatic, with the rapid growth of crèches – at the same time as the 
expansion of public provision (through Grade R in school). 
 
Unlike the liberal welfare regimes of the global North, however, South Africa’s 
social assistance programmes have a very wide reach: almost one in three adults 
and children receives every month a grant of some sort, and about two-thirds of 
the population lives in a household where someone receives a grant of some 
sort.14 Similarly, the proportion of South African children in formal, court-
ordered foster care is very high in comparison to other countries. This suggests a 
welfare regime that is somewhere in between a targeted ‘liberal’ regime and a 
more inclusive or universal ‘social democratic’ one. Coverage is less than 
universal (although the government committed itself, in 2013, to removing the 
means test on the old-age pension, making it universal). Decommodification has 
its limits.  
 
South Africa’s welfare and care regimes also rely far more heavily on family 
and kin than either the classic liberal or social democratic regimes of the global 
North. Public provision in South Africa does not so much fill the gaps left by the 
market as fill the gaps left by diminished kin provision. Kin care for children, 
sometimes in return for modest remuneration, they look after the elderly when 
necessary and they tend for the sick and disabled. They also bear the primary 
burden of supporting financially unemployed and other jobless working-age 
                                           
14
 NIDS wave 1, own calculations. 
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adults. South Africa’s welfare and care regimes thus share some features with 
some of the family-oriented ‘conservative’ welfare regimes of Europe, including 
especially Southern Europe (Ferrera, 1996; Naldini, 2003). 
 
Over the past century, both the depth and breadth of kin provision have 
declined. This decline has been especially striking with respect to paternal kin, 
with the decline of patrilineal responsibility. The physical separation of fathers 
and even mothers from their children, the uncertainty of employment, the 
inadequacy of wages, and cultural norms that support more fluid roles for adults 
result in pensioned grandparents – especially maternal grandmothers – providing 
substantial care-work in many South African families. The extended family has 
not disappeared, but its roles have changed.  
 
The complexity of South Africa’s welfare and care regimes reflect their dualist 
history. Liberal welfare and care regimes were provided for white South 
Africans, although they were more closely aligned with the ‘wage-earners 
welfare regimes’ of Australia and New Zealand (Castles, 1985), with extensive 
state intervention in the labour market, than the British model (Seekings and 
Nattrass, 2005). The apartheid state provided little for its African subjects, who 
relied primarily on kin. The deracialisation of public policies and the decline in 
kin support in the late twentieth century pushed the welfare regime in a more 
social democratic direction, but the state retreated from its limited role in care, 
pushing people into reliance on kin or (increasingly) market. The South African 
welfare and care regimes have some similarities with the family-oriented 
Southern European cases. One difference, however, is that the extended family 
in South Africa remains important whilst having undergone dramatic change. 
Kin are crucial to care and financial support, but patterns of kin support are very 
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